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Abstract
We construct a general equilibrium model with incomplete markets and borrowing con-
straints, in order to study the term structure of real interest rates. Agents are subject to both
aggregate and idiosyncratic income shocks, which latter may force them into early portfolio
liquidation whilst in recession. We derive a closed-form equilibrium with limited agents’ het-
erogeneity (despite market incompleteness), which allows us to derive analytical expressions for
bond prices and returns at any maturity. The desirability of bonds as liquidity makes the ag-
gregate bond demand downward-sloping. One consequence of this is that a larger bond supply
raises both the level and the slope of the yield curve.
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1 Introduction
Incomplete markets models have frequently been argued to overcome some of the diﬃculties en-
countered by the representative agent framework. They notably contribute to explain important
features of asset prices, such as the level of the risk-free rate (Huggett (1993)), the size of the
equity premium (Constantinides and Duﬃe (1996)), or the existence of money (Bewley (1983);
Scheinkman and Weiss (1986)). These contributions are based on the central idea that market
incompleteness introduces a speciﬁc motive for demanding (and actually trading) available assets,
since those are used to smooth out the idiosyncratic ﬂuctuations that agents face.
Despite the potential insights to be gained, the term structure of interest rates studied under
complete markets in the seminal article of Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (1985), has been the subject
of a surprisingly small number of studies with uninsurable idiosyncratic shocks. One potential
explanation is the inherent complexity of inﬁnite-horizon, incomplete market models with a large
number of assets. On the one hand, market incompleteness usually implies that agents’ wealth and
optimal decisions depend on the whole history of idiosyncratic income shocks, so that inﬁnitely many
types of agents (and associated Euler equations) coexist in the economy. This usually precludes
the derivation of analytical expressions and general conclusions about asset prices, except in very
special cases such as the paper of Constantinides and Duﬃe (1996) or the deterministic liquidity
constrained model of Kehoe and Levine (2001). On the other hand, the very nature of computational
techniques, when applied to models with uninsurable income shocks limits their scope to the study
of approximate equilibria with a limited number of assets, typically one or two (as in Krusell and
Smith (1997)).
In this paper, we analyze the term structure of real interest rates within an incomplete market,
general equilibrium model that features a single good, as well as both inﬁnitely-lived agents and
arbitrarily many bond maturities. We manage to do so by assuming a speciﬁc implication of unin-
surable income shocks: After a fall in current individual income, agents are supposed to liquidate
all their assets. In our model, such an asset liquidation by low-income agents is obtained if their
ability to trade assets is restricted by an (exogenously imposed) debt limit. We concentrate on a
particular equilibrium where asset liquidation is full, in the sense that agents facing a drop in their
current earnings liquidate their bond portfolio entirely. As we show, the implied dynamic equi-
librium allows us to characterize analytically the entire term structure of interest rates (including
prices, yields, and returns of arbitrarily long bonds).
The main features of our model are as follows. The idiosyncratic income risk is speciﬁed as a
random switch of agents’ status between ‘employment’ and ‘unemployment’. Unemployed agents
earn a (low) home production income, while employed agents rent out their labor services to a
constant return-to-scale ﬁrm hit by aggregate productivity shocks. Agents’ attempts to smooth
out their labor income ﬂuctuations result in twofold consequences. (i) When employed, employed
agents accumulate bonds for self-insurance purposes, and (ii) when falling into unemployed, they
liquidate them. To close the model, we assume that the government constantly renews stocks of
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zero-coupon bonds of all maturities. The deterministic ﬁnal payment of bonds is ﬁnanced through
taxes that are designed to minimize distortions.
Given this market structure, we start our analysis by establishing the existence conditions for
an equilibrium with full asset liquidation to prevail. This allows us to demonstrate the existence
of an equilibrium price system with arbitrarily many maturities, in the case where both aggregate
uncertainty and the total net supply of bonds are small (proposition 1).
We ask then the following question: How does the shape of the yield curve change as the net
supply of bonds changes? Our ﬁrst result is that the aggregate bond demand is downward-sloping :
Increasing the supply of bonds of any maturity lowers the price of all bonds, that is, it raises the
entire yield curve. This eﬀect is easily understood from the liquidity role played by bonds in our
economy. More speciﬁcally, the conjunction of idiosyncratic income risk with trade restrictions (i.e.,
debt limits) induces high-income agents to hold bonds of any maturity for precautionary purposes.
In this context, more liquidity lowers its desirability and equilibrium prices. Since bonds of various
maturities are partly substitute of each other, raising the supply of one particular type of bonds
must lower the price of all bonds.
Our second result states that a larger bond supply steepens the yield curve. The result bears
upon the relative prices of bonds with diﬀerent maturities, that is, the risk premia associated
with each bond. In our model, risk premia diﬀer across bonds because agents may be forced into
liquidating assets before maturity, when their selling price is low due to the aggregate uncertainty.
Since the risk of early liquidation increases with the bond maturity, long bonds must command a
higher premium in equilibrium than comparatively shorter ones. We then show that raising the
supply of bonds of any maturity raises the slope of the yield curve because it sharpens the variability
of the liquidation value of agents’ portfolio. Thus, both the level and the slope of the yield curve
tend to rise as the supply of bonds increases (proposition 2).1
We end the paper by analyzing the welfare properties of our incomplete market model. More
speciﬁcally, we establish that while increasing the quantity of bonds of any maturity unambiguously
raises ex ante welfare (i.e., from the point of view of date 0, before agents know their type), it may
decrease the welfare of some agents, when they are already aware of their type (proposition 3). In
a very simple way, employed agents who have to buy assets for self-insurance may suﬀer from a
larger supply; since they have to bear higher taxes.
The rest of paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our framework. The third section
describes the equilibrium with full asset liquidation, while Section 4 establishes the conditions for
its existence. Section 5 studies the impact of changes in the bond supply on the shape of the yield
curve. Section 6 derives the welfare properties of the model, and Section 7 discusses further results,
which can be derived within this framework, and concludes.
1See Fleming (2002) for empirical evidence about the impact of the net bond supply on the yield curve consistent
with these results. See also Jegadeesh (2002) for a more general discussion of this evidence.
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2 The economy
2.1 Individual and aggregate states
In every period, each agent can be in either of two states, ‘employed’ or ‘unemployed’. Let eit denote
the status of the agent i at date t. The process eit = 1 if the agent is employed and e
i
t = 0 if the
agent is unemployed. Each agent’s employment status on the labor market evolves independently
according to a ﬁrst-order Markov chain with the following transition matrix:
Π =
[
α 1− α
1− ρ ρ
]
, (α, ρ) ∈ (0, 1)2 ,
where α is the probability that an employed agent stays employed in the next period and ρ is the
probability that an unemployed agent stays unemployed in the next period.
The initial probability distribution is represented by a row vector ω0 =
[
ωe0 ω
u
0
]
, i.e. ωe0 (ω
u
0
respectively) is the probability at date 0 that the agent i is employed (unemployed). Thanks to
this simple Markovian structure, the probability distribution at date t is ω0 Πt, which converges for
t→∞ towards the invariant distribution ω =
[
ωe ωu
]
, where:
ωe = (1− ρ) (2− ρ− α)−1 , ωu = (1− α) (2− ρ− α)−1 . (1)
To simplify the exposition, we assume that ω0 = ω (i.e., the initial proportions of employed and
unemployed agents are given by the invariant distribution).
The history of individual shocks up to date t is denoted by ei,t, where ei,t = {ei0, . . . , eit} ∈
{0, 1}t = Et. Et is the set of all possible individual histories up to date t, and µit : Et → [0, 1], t =
0, 1, . . . denotes the probability measure of individual histories, consistent with the transition matrix
Π and with the initial probability distribution ω. For example, µit
(
ei,t
)
is the probability that the
agent i experiences the history ei,t at date t. We use the notation ei,t+1  ei,t to indicate that ei,t+1
is a possible continuation of ei,t.
The economy faces an aggregate (technology) shock, whose value at date t is ht. The value
taken by this shock can be either high (ht = h) or low (ht = l). Let ht = {h0, . . . , ht} denote the
history of aggregate shocks from date 0 to date t, and Ht be the set of all such possible histories.
The aggregate shock evolves according to a ﬁrst-order Markov chain with transition matrix T :
T =
[
πh 1− πh
1− πl πl
]
Moreover, we make the following assumption:
Assumption A πh + πl > 1.
The assumption A is a statement about the persistence of aggregate shocks. In words, the
economy does not ﬂuctuate too quickly between both aggregate states. While not necessary for the
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derivation of most of our results, it allows us to avoid discussing some uninteresting cases arising
with rapidly alternating states2.
The invariant distribution associated with the transition matrix T is denoted Φ = [Φl Φh]. We
assume that the initial probability distribution across both aggregate states is Φ. We denote νt the
probability measure over histories up to date t, consistent with the transition matrix T , and the
initial distribution Φ: νt : Ht → [0, 1], t = 0, 1, . . . Finally, we denote by νt
(
ht
)
the probability that
the history ht occurs, and ht+1  ht indicates that ht+1 is a possible continuation of ht.
2.2 Assets and market structure
We posit a sharp form of market incompleteness by assuming that individual agents cannot issue
any ﬁnancial securities. This has three signiﬁcant implications. First, no asset provides a payoﬀ
contingent on agents’ idiosyncratic employment status. The unemployment risk is thus entirely
uninsurable. Second, agents face an exogenous debt limit preventing them from issuing debt secu-
rities in both aggregate states. Third, no security oﬀers a payoﬀ contingent to the aggregate state
of the economy. We thus only study the yields of bonds, whose terminal payoﬀ is certain. These
properties are the heart of a vast literature on liquidity-constrained economies3 since the seminal
work of Bewley (1980).
The only assets that agents may buy and sell are riskless zero-coupon bonds. They pay oﬀ one
unit of goods at maturity, and are issued by the government. The maturities of these bonds vary
from 1 to n ≥ 1, where n may be arbitrarily large. A bond of maturity k > 1 at date t becomes a
bond of maturity k − 1 at date t+ 1, and eventually yields 1 at date t+ k. The price of this bond
at date t is denoted pt,k(ht). To simplify notations, we deﬁne the price of a bond of maturity 0 as
its payoﬀ: pt,0(ht) = 1.
Bond payoﬀs are ﬁnanced by both new government bond issuances and taxes. At each date t,
a given net quantity At,k of zero coupon bonds paying one unit of good at period t+ k is issued by
the government at price pt,k(ht). The government repays bonds arriving at maturity at date t
In order to minimize tax distortions, we assume that the government uses lump-sum transfers
contingent to the employment status. Unemployed agents pay no tax, while all employed agents
pay the same amount τ e.4 Given that the latter are in proportion ωe, the government budget
constraint is given by:
n∑
k=1
pt,k At,k + ωe τ et =
n∑
k=1
At−k,k
The aggregate supply of securities with a given maturity is composed of newly issued bonds of
that maturity plus longer bonds issued earlier and becoming closer to maturity. At date t, a total
2This assumption appears as empirically relevant: Using US quarterly data on GNP, Hamilton (1994), chap 22,
ﬁnds that πh + πl = 1.65.
3See Kehoe and Levine (2001) for references on related papers.
4Introducing either proportional taxes on the labor income or lump sum taxes on the unemployed would generate
additional distortions and/or redistributive eﬀects, whose impacts are beyond the scope of this paper.
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quantity Bt,k of bonds reaching maturity at date t + k is available on the market, where:
Bt,k ≡
n−k∑
j=0
At−j,k+j
For sake of conciseness, we focus on the case where the quantity bonds of a given maturity is
constant (i.e., Bt,k = Bk, ∀t ≥ 0), but the model can easily accommodate stochastic changes in
the bond supply. Constant bond quantities per maturity is equivalent to constant issuances, i.e.
At,k = Ak, ∀t ≥ 0.
2.3 Firms
There is a large number of perfectly competitive ﬁrms, which produce a single ﬁnal good using
only labor with a constant return-to-scale technology. The labor productivity, zt, depends on the
aggregate state of the economy. The productivity levels in state h and l are respectively zh and zl,
where zh ≥ 1 ≥ zl > 0. The ﬁrms’ proﬁt maximization under perfect competition implies that the
real wage wt is equal to the marginal product of labor, i.e. wt = zt.
2.4 agents
There is a continuum of agents of mass 1. Each agent i has preferences over consumption and
labor. We follow Scheinkman an Weiss (1986) in assuming that intertemporal preferences are time-
separable and that the agents’ instantaneous utility is u (c)− l, where c is the consumption, l is the
labor supply, and u is a C2 function satisfying u′ (.) > 0, and u′′ (.) < 0. The marginal disutility
of labor is constant and normalized to 1. All agents discount their instantaneous utility with the
same factor β ∈ (0, 1).
In period t, each agent i consumes an amount cit, supplies the labor quantity l
i
t, and demands
the quantity bit,k of bonds with maturity k. The agent also pays a lump-sum tax τt(e
i
t), which
is contingent to his employment status. Employed agents choose their labor supply and earn a
hourly wage equal to wt. Unemployed agents earn no labor income, but a constant amount of home
production δ ≥ 0. Their labor supply is by deﬁnition equal to 0. We note bi−1,k the quantity of
k–period bonds that the agent i holds at the beginning of period 0. Speciﬁc assumptions about
initial bond holdings will be made in section 4 in order to simplify the transitional dynamics of the
model.
The agent i’s problem consists in choosing the following sequences of functions:
cit : H
t × Et → R+
lit : H
t × Et → R+
bit,k : H
t × Et → R+ k = 1, . . . , n
⎫⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎭ t = 0, 1, . . .
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which maximize the agent’s intertemporal expected utility:
∞∑
t=0
βt
∑
ht∈Ht
νt
(
ht
) ∑
ei,t∈Et
µit
(
ei,t
) (
u
(
cit
(
ht, ei,t
))− lit (ht, ei,t)) ,
subject to the following constraints:
cit
(
ht, ei,t
)
+ τt(eit) +
n∑
k=1
pt,k
(
ht
)
bit,k
(
ht, ei,t
)
=
n∑
k=1
pt,k−1
(
ht
)
bit−1,k
(
ht−1, ei,t−1
)
+ eitztl
i
t
(
ht, ei,t
)
+
(
1− eit
)
δ (2)
cit
(
ht, ei,t
)
, lit
(
ht, ei,t
) ≥ 0 (3)
bit,k
(
ht, ei,t
) ≥ 0 (4)
lim
t→∞β
tu′
(
ct
(
ht, ei,t
))
bit,k
(
ht, ei,t
)
= 0 for k = 1, . . . , n (5)
The budget constraint (2) equalizes agents’ inﬂows and total outﬂows at date t. The total
inﬂows of the agent i at date t is the sum of the sale value of the bond portfolio on the one hand,
and on the other hand, of the labor income if eit = 1, or of the home production income if e
i
t = 0.
The agent spends his current income on consumption goods and on bonds of various maturities,
as well as on paying lump sum taxes. The constraint (4) indicates that agents cannot issue any
debt securities. Finally, (5) is the set of transversality conditions, which always hold along the
equilibrium we will be considering.
We also make the following assumption:
Assumption B 1/zl < u′ (δ)
This assumption implies that in equilibrium, the marginal utility of the consumption enjoyed
by an unemployed agent is always higher than that the one enjoyed by an employed agent (i.e. the
unemployed are always worse-oﬀ than the employed in both aggregate states). In other words, the
utility gain aﬀorded by one unit of labor paid at the lowest wage provides an upper bound for the
jobless income δ.
The Lagrangian function associated with the agent i’s problem is as follows:
L =
∞∑
t=0
βt
∑
ht∈Ht
νt
(
ht
) ∑
ei,t∈Et
µt
(
ei,t
)×[u (cit (ht, ei,t))− lit (ht, ei,t)+ n∑
k=1
ϕit,k
(
ht, ei,t
)
bit,k
(
ht, ei,t
)
+ ηit
(
ht, ei,t
)(
eit zt l
i
t
(
ht, ei,t
)
+
(
1− eit
)
δ − τt(eit) +
n∑
k=1
pt,k−1
(
ht
)
bit−1,k
(
ht−1, ei,t−1
)
−cit
(
ht, ei,t
)− n∑
k=1
pt,k
(
ht
)
bit,k
(
ht, ei,t
))]
The Lagrange multipliers ηit and ϕ
i
t,k are positive functions deﬁned over H
t × Et, and are
associated with the budget constraint (2) and the borrowing constraint (4), respectively. (We check
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below that the nonnegativity constraints (3) for cit and l
i
t are always satisﬁed in the equilibrium we
consider). From the Kuhn and Tucker theorem, the optimality conditions are, for t = 0, 1, . . . and
for all
(
ht, ei,t
) ∈ Ht × Et:
u′
(
cit
(
ht, ei,t
))
= ηit
(
ht, ei,t
)
(6){
ηit
(
ht, ei,t
)
= 1/zt if eit = 1
lit
(
ht, ei,t
)
= 0 if eit = 0
(7)
ηit
(
ht, ei,t
)
pt,k
(
ht
)
= β
∑
ht+1ht
νt+1
(
ht+1
) ∑
ei,t+1ei,t
µit+1
(
ei,t+1
)
ηit+1
(
ht+1, ei,t+1
)
pt+1,k−1
(
ht+1
)
+ϕit,k
(
ht, ei,t
)
for k = 1, . . . , n (8){
either ϕit,k
(
ht, ei,t
)
> 0 and bit,k
(
ht, ei,t
)
= 0
or ϕit,k
(
ht, ei,t
)
= 0 and bit,k
(
ht, ei,t
)
> 0
for k = 1, . . . , n (9)
The equation (6) deﬁnes the agent i′’s marginal utility of consumption, while the equality (7)
expresses his optimal labor supply. When the agent works (eit = 1), he equalizes the marginal
gain in consumption and the marginal pain of labor (i.e., 1/u′
(
cit
(
ht, ei,t
))
= 1/zt), while no labor
supply is provided when the agent is unemployed (eit = 0). The equation (8) is the intertemporal
optimality condition, which can also be written more compactly as:
u′
(
cit
(
ht, ei,t
))
pt,k
(
ht
)
= βEt
[
u′
(
cit+1
(
ht+1, ei,t
))
pt+1,k−1
(
ht+1
)]
+ ϕit,k
(
ht, ei,t
)
, (10)
where Et[·] is the expectation over aggregate and idiosyncratic states, conditional on the information
available at date t (i.e. ht and ei,t here). The Euler equation (10) equalizes the marginal cost of
acquiring one unit of bonds of each maturity today with the marginal gain associated with its
payoﬀ tomorrow. When the shadow cost of the borrowing constraints is positive, meaning that
the constraint is actually binding (ϕit,k
(
ht, ei,t
)
> 0), then the agent i would like to increase his
expected utility by issuing k-period bonds (but he is prevented from doing so by assumption).
The equation (9) ﬁnally summarizes the relationship between the shadow-cost ϕt,k and the binding
borrowing constraint.
2.5 Market clearing
The bond markets clear at date t when the bond supply for each maturity equates the bond demand
for the same maturity, i.e.: ∫ 1
0
bit,k
(
ht, ei,t
)
di = Bk, ∀k = 1, . . . , n. (11)
By the Walras Law, the good market clears when all the bond markets clear.
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3 Equilibrium with full asset liquidation
One implication of our particular market structure is that available assets play the role of buﬀer
stocks, since they allow agents to partially oﬀset the lack of full credit and insurance markets.
However, many models of this class imply a smooth portfolio rebalancing in equilibrium: High
income agents gradually build up their asset wealth, while low income ones decumulate assets at a
suﬃciently slow pace not to ever actually hit the borrowing constraint (e.g. Scheinkman and Weiss
(1986), or Aiyagari (1994)). Since we focus on the implications of the liquidation risk for the bond
pricing, we construct our equilibrium in such a way that agents indeed liquidate assets when a bad
idiosyncratic income shock hurts (i.e., bit,k
(
ht, ei,t
)
= 0 for k = 1, . . . , n if eit = 0). All low income
agents face therefore a binding credit constraint, which cannot be oﬀset through bond liquidation.
Incidentally, this full liquidation of bond holdings drastically reduces the number of agent types in
the economy, thereby allowing us to study bond pricing analytically for an arbitrarily large number
of maturities.
Our equilibrium is obtained by construction: We ﬁrst conjecture, and then derive a suﬃcient
condition for, the existence of an equilibrium along which employed agents are never borrowing-
constrained (i.e. they are willing to save and thus hold a positive quantity of bonds at the end of
the current period), while unemployed ones always hit the borrowing constraint (i.e. they would
like to borrow, rather than hold positive bond holdings, at the end of the current period). From
(9), this joint conjecture can formally be written as:{
If eit = 1 then ϕ
i
t,k
(
ht, ei,t
)
= 0
If eit = 0 then ϕ
i
t,k
(
ht, ei,t
)
> 0
for all k = 1, . . . , n (12)
3.1 Equilibrium consumption levels
Let us ﬁrst consider the consumption of an unemployed agent in period t. If the agent was employed
in the previous period, then from the budget constraint (2) and conjecture (12), he earns the home
production δ and the liquidation value of his portfolio. He consumes his complete revenue, because
he is borrowing constrained. His consumption expresses therefore as:
cit =
n∑
k=1
pt,k−1 bit−1,k + δ (> 0) (13)
The consumption of unemployed agents, who were already unemployed in the previous period, is
identical across analogous agents. They earn the home production δ and cannot raise consumption
through borrowing. Their current consumption, denoted cuut , is thus:
cuut = δ (> 0) (14)
Let us now turn to employed agents. From their intratemporal optimality conditions (6) and (7),
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their consumption level, denoted cet , is identical across employed agents. Employed agents equalize
the marginal utility of consumption to the marginal pain of labor. The constant disutility of labor
pins down the consumption, which depends only on preference parameters and the aggregate shock:
ce = u′−1 (1/zt) (> 0) (15)
If this agent is employed in the next period, which occurs with the probability α, then ηit+1 = 1 (see
Eq. (7)). If the agent falls into unemployment in the next period, then from (6) ηit+1 = u
′ (cit+1),
where by construction cit+1 is given by the equality (13). From the ﬁrst order conditions (6), (7),
and (10 ) of the agent program and the equation (12), Euler equations for employed agents is given
by (k = 1, . . . , n):
pt,k
zt
= αβEt
[
pt+1,k−1
zt+1
]
+ (1− α)βEt
⎡⎣u′
⎛⎝ n∑
j=1
pt+1,j−1 bit,j + δ
⎞⎠ pt+1,k−1
⎤⎦ (16)
We restrict our attention to the symmetric equilibrium, where all employed agents hold the same
quantities of bonds for maturities k = 1, . . . , n. These quantities are only determined by preference
parameters and aggregate variables. Hence, we denote bet,k the quantity of k–period bond held
by employed agents at date t. The consumption level ceut is now identical across agents, who are
unemployed at date t and were employed at date t− 1. The equation (13) becomes therefore:
ceut =
n∑
k=1
pt,k−1 bet−1,k + δ (17)
3.2 Market clearing
Because all employed agents hold the same quantity of securities for each maturity, and unemployed
agents do not hold any asset, the bond market equilibrium (11) is simply:
ωebet,k = Bk, ∀k = 1, . . . , n. (18)
where ωe is the share of employed agents in the population given by (1).
3.3 Pricing equations
Since all employed agents hold the same quantity of securities, we are able to derive the simple
Euler pricing equations, which are the central equations of this paper. Using the Euler equation
(16) and the market equilibria (18), one obtains, for all t ≥ 0 and k ∈ {1, . . . , n}:
pt,k
zt
= αβEt
[
pt+1,k−1
zt+1
]
+ (1− α)βEt
⎡⎣pt+1,k−1 u′
⎛⎝δ + 1
ωe
n∑
j=1
pt+1,j−1Bj
⎞⎠⎤⎦ (19)
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The previous equations pin down the price of any bond as a function of the current and next
aggregate states, of all future prices, and of the bond supply. Each of these equations express the
price of a k–period bond as the sum of two distinct terms, depending on the employment status of
the agent in the next period. If the agent stays employed (which occurs with probability α), then
the labor supply freely adjusts to equalize the marginal utility of consumption with the inverse of
the real wage 1/zt+1. This term is the only one that would prevail if markets were complete and
if agents were fully able to smooth out idiosyncratic income shocks. The second term in the right
hand side of the equation (19) reﬂects the liquidation risk, associated with the possibility that the
agent could be hurt by an unfavorable change in employment status. Bond quantities directly aﬀect
prices through their eﬀect on the value of the liquidated portfolio, which in turn feeds back into
current equilibrium prices.
3.4 Conjectured asset price structure
We focus on the equilibrium where bond prices depend only on the realization of aggregate shocks.
Following the literature on asset pricing with a ﬁnite state space (Mehra and Prescott (1985) among
others), we conjecture the following expression for bond prices:
∀t ≥ 0,∀k ∈ {1, . . . , n},∀s ∈ {h, l} pst,k = Csk zs, (20)
where the Csks are constant. This conjectured price structure exhibits a form of stationarity, as
bond prices depend only on their maturity and the current aggregate state. In consequence, there
are two yield curves, one for each value of the aggregate state. Our existence proof will thus consist
in showing that such a stationary equilibrium exists.
The pricing equations (19) expressed in both states h and l provide the expressions for Chk and
C lk for k ≥ 1. We introduce the following notations:[
Ch0
C l0
]
≡
[
1/zh
1/zl
]
(21)⎧⎨⎩ u
′h ≡ u′
(
δ +
∑n−1
i=0 C
h
i z
h Bi+1/ω
e
)
u′l ≡ u′
(
δ +
∑n−1
i=0 C
l
i z
l Bi+1/ω
e
) (22)
The price structure (19) can then be written compactly in a recursive form as follows, for
k = 1, . . . , n: [
Chk
C lk
]
= β T ·
[
α + (1− α) zh u′h 0
0 α + (1− α) zl u′l
]
·
[
Chk−1
C lk−1
]
(23)
This system provides 2 × n equations that determine the 2 × n coeﬃcients {Chk , C lk}k=1,...,n.
This system is not linear, because the whole price structure appears in each coeﬃcient u′h and u′l.
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The yield to maturity of a bond with maturity k = 1, . . . , n in state s = h, l and in period t ≥ 0
is deﬁned by the usual expression rst,k = −k−1 ln pst,k. Interest rates are supposed to be continuously
compounded. The average yield curve is the sum of yield curves in states h and l weighted by the
average frequency of aggregate state h and l (given by the matrix T ). The average yield rt,k of
maturity k at date t is thus:
rt,k =
1− πl
2− πl − πh r
h
t,k +
1− πh
2− πl − πh r
l
t,k. (24)
This simple recursive structure is now used ﬁrst to prove the existence of a stationary equilib-
rium, and then to analyze how the equilibrium yield curve is aﬀected by the bond supply.
4 Existence of the equilibrium
We begin with imposing some general conditions ensuring that our equilibrium with limited agents’
heterogeneity exists. We then establish the existence of an equilibrium with an arbitrarily large
number of bond maturities. This is done ﬁrst by deriving the equilibrium yield curve under ag-
gregate certainty and zero net supply for all maturities. We show then, that the yield curve is
continuous with respect to both the introduction of small aggregate uncertainty and that of small
and positive supply of bonds. This allows us to extend our existence result to a more general case.
4.1 General conditions for the equilibrium to exist
The stationary distribution with four agents’ types is constructed under the assumption that un-
employed agents are always borrowing-constrained, while no employed agent is. We now derive the
conditions under which this is indeed the case.
4.1.1 Condition on agents’ initial wealth
In order to avoid the complications related to the transitional adjustment of agents’ wealth levels
towards the steady state, we assume that at the beginning of period 0, employed agents have a
probability α to hold an initial quantity of bonds bee−1,k = Bk/ω
e, and a probability 1 − α to hold
bue−1,k = 0. Unemployed agents have a probability ρ to hold b
uu
−1,k = 0, and a probability 1 − ρ to
hold beu−1,k = Bk/ω
e. In consequence, from an ex ante point of view, agents have a probability αωe
to be employed with positive bond holdings, and a probability (1− ρ) ωu to be unemployed with
positive bond holdings. The initial cross distribution of labor status and bond holdings is thus
identical to the stationary one.
4.1.2 Condition on parameter values
agents who are unemployed at both dates t − 1 and t consume the amount cuut+1 = δ. If they
become employed in the next period, which occurs with probability 1 − ρ, then ηit+1 = 1 (see
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Eq. (7)). Moreover, if they remain unemployed, which occurs with probability ρ, then from (6)
ηit+1 = u
′ (cuut+1) = u′ (δ). Equations (6), (7), and (10) imply that the condition (12), which
precisely states that these agents are constrained, is equivalent to:
∀k = 1, . . . , n, pt,k u′ (δ) > β (1− ρ)Et
[
pt+1,k−1
zt+1
]
+ βρu′ (δ) Et
[
pt+1,k−1u′ (δ)
]
(25)
agents who were employed at date t− 1 and become unemployed at date t consume their home
production δ as well as the liquidation value of their bond portfolio. From the equation (12) again,
these agents face binding borrowing constraints if and only if:
∀k pt,k u′
⎛⎝δ + n∑
j=1
pt,j−1 bet−1,j
⎞⎠ > β (1− ρ)Et [pt+1,k−1
zt+1
]
+ βρu′ (δ) Et
[
pt+1,k−1u′ (δ)
]
(26)
Note that the inequality (25) holds; as soon as (26) does. We thus only need to check that
the inequality (26) holds, i.e. that agents just falling into unemployment become constrained and
liquidate their bond portfolio. This in turn implies that unemployed agents who were already so,
also face binding borrowing constraint.
4.2 Equilibrium existence with zero net supply and no aggregate shock
If assets are in zero net supply, then
∑n
j=1 pt,j−1 b
e
t−1,j = 0. With no aggregate uncertainty, zt = z
∀t, and the equation (20) becomes pt,k = Ckz (i.e. the Csks only depend on the bond maturity).
Then, substituting (20) into (19) and (26) and rearranging, we obtain that the inequality (26) is
equivalent to: (
α + (1− α)u′ (δ))u′ (δ) > (1− ρ) + ρ u′ (δ)
Since u′ (δ) > 1 (from assumption B), this condition is satisﬁed as soon as α < 15. As long
as credit constraints are binding, our equilibrium exists in an economy without aggregate risk and
with a zero net supply.
4.3 Continuity of the yield curve as a function of bond supply and shocks
The following proposition summarizes the regularity property of the yield curve, which will be used
extensively below. We introduce the following notations: B is the (column) vector of bond quantities
for the n maturities: B = [B1 . . . Bn]
, Z the vector of wages (or equivalently productivities)
Z =
[
zl zh
] and C is the vector of coeﬃcients for both states h and l and the n maturities:
C =
[
Ch1 C
l
1 . . . C
h
n C
l
n
]. 1n and 0n are vectors of length n containing only 1 and 0, respectively.
Proposition 1 (Regularity of the yield curve) If B is in the neighborhood of 0n and Z in the
neighborhood of 12 , then C is a C1 function of B and of Z. The equilibrium exists; as long as both
the aggregate uncertainty and the bond supply are small.
5The RHS reaches its maximum u′ (δ) when ρ = 1 and when α < 1, we have (α + (1− α)u′ (δ))u′ (δ) > u′ (δ).
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All proofs are gathered in the Appendix. The proposition 1 essentially states that, starting
from a no uncertainty-zero net supply situation, a gradual increases in the aggregate risk or in the
bond supply does not cause the yield curve to jump.
4.4 Equilibrium existence in the general case
The system (23) with initial conditions (21) deﬁnes the vector of price constants C as a continuous
function of bond volumes B and of real wages Z, when
[
B Z
]
is in a neighborhood V1 of[
0n 12
]
. Moreover, if
[
B Z
]
=
[
0n 12
]
, the equilibrium vector C satisﬁes conditions (26). By
continuity, there exists a neighborhood V2 ⊂ V1 of
[
0n 12
]
, such that conditions (26) is fulﬁlled if[
B Z
] ∈ V2.
If the supply of bonds of any maturities remains small, and if the variance of the aggregate
shock is low enough (the process z remains around the mean 1), then the equilibrium with four
agents’ types exists.
5 Volume eﬀects on the yield curve
We may now state our main results regarding the impact of bond volumes on the yield curve. The
following lemma characterizes the ranking of yield curves according to the aggregate state. All
results are obtained for α < 1 and B small enough for the equilibrium to exist.
Lemma 1 (Ranking of yield curves) The yield curve in the good aggregate state lies strictly
below the one in the bad aggregate state: rhk < r
l
k k = 1, . . . , n. Yields in both aggregate states
converge to a common limit: lim
k→∞
rlk = lim
k→∞
rhk = r
lim.
Note that this statement is not related to the presence of borrowing constraints per se. In the
good state, employed agents choose a higher level of savings than in the bad state (where their
labor income is lower), leading to higher bond prices for all maturities in the good state than in
the bad state.
We deﬁne the slope of the yield curve ∆ as the diﬀerence between the long run yield rlim (see
lemma 2) and the average short yield, r1 given by (24): ∆ = rlim − r1. The following proposition
summarizes the eﬀect of a variation in the net supply of bonds on the level and the slope of the
yield curve.
Proposition 2 (Impact of bond volumes on the shape of the curve) 1) Raising the net sup-
ply of bonds of any maturity increases the level of the yield curve:
∂psk
∂Bi
< 0 for i, k = 1, . . . , n
et s = h, l.
Moreover if α is close to 1, then:
2) Raising the net supply of bonds of any maturity increases the slope of the yield curve :
∂∆
∂Bi
> 0
for i = 1, . . . , n.
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The ﬁrst statement in the proposition 2 establishes that a larger bond supply of any maturity
decreases the prices bonds of all maturities (including the price of arbitrarily long bonds) in both
aggregate states, and thus shifts the yield curve upward. This eﬀect stems from the speciﬁc liquidity
role played by bonds in this economy. Employed agents, who earn a high labor market income,
want to self-insure themselves against the risk of falling into unemployment. Available bonds of
any maturity may serve this purpose. A small supply of bonds makes such liquidity devices highly
valuable and thus yields a high price, relative to a situation where bonds are abundant. Conversely,
an increase in the total liquidity, through for example a larger bond supply (whatever the maturity),
lowers the price of all bonds. Put it shortly, incomplete markets coupled with borrowing constraints
make the aggregate bond demand downward-sloping (notice that when α = 1 no agent is ever
constrained and this eﬀect of bond supply on equilibrium prices vanishes)6.
The second statement in proposition 2 bears upon the variations in relative bond prices induced
by a variation in the total supply of bonds. It is noteworthy that α should be close to 17.The increase
in the supply of bonds raises the slope of the yield curve because of two eﬀects. First, note that
agents care about the expected liquidation value of their portfolio in the next period, which is∑n
j=1 pt+1,j−1(Bj/ω
e). For simpliﬁcation purpose, we assume that the volume of bonds with a
maturity k > 1 increases, whereas all other volumes are null. In this case, the variance of the
portfolio is var [pt+1,k−1] (Bk/ωe)2, which increases with Bk: The liquidation value of the portfolio
becomes more volatile, when the bond supply increases, whatever its maturity. However, long-
term bonds are more likely to be liquidated before maturity. When the volatility of the portfolio
increases, this increases the risk of holding long term bonds, which commands therefore a larger
risk premium than for shorter ones. Second, when the volumes of bonds increase, agents are better
able to self-insure themselves. In consequence, their demand for self-insurance decreases. As bonds
of various maturities are imperfect substitutes of each other, because their probability to be sold
before maturity diﬀers, the relative demand for longer bonds decreases compared to shorter ones.
Here again, both eﬀects of the total supply of bonds on the slope vanishes, when the idiosyncratic
uncertainty shuts down (i.e. when α = 1).
6 Welfare
In our model, the net bond supply is arbitrarily set. Taxes simply adjust, so as to satisfy the
government budget constraint at all times. The equilibrium is then indexed by the quantity of bonds
available in the economy. This model is simple enough to allow us to rank equilibria according to
6The positive eﬀect of bond volumes on interest rates have been underlined in various empirical works (Duﬀee
(1996), Fleming (2002) among others). Other empirical studies, however, have found the opposite eﬀect (see Amihud
and Mendelson (1991), for example). Jegadeesh (2002) conjectures that the negative eﬀect of volumes on prices may
occur in markets, which lack depth. In such markets, a larger bond supply may increase trading volumes, thereby
reducing trading frictions and raising prices.
7This case where α is close to one seems to be the most relevant one empirically. According to Nickell, Nunziata,
Ochel, and Quintini (2001), annual job-loss probabilities (1−α in our model) are no higher than 0.04 in most OECD
countries.
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a Pareto criterion.
Proposition 3 (Pareto ranking of equilibria) Without aggregate shock, a larger bond supply:
1. always increases, in a Pareto sense, ex ante welfare,
2. always increases the welfare of ee and eu agents, but increases the welfare of ue and uu agents
if and only if β > [α + (1− α)u]−1.
If from an ex ante point of view, when agents ignore their types, a larger bond supply is Pareto
improving, this improvement is not homogeneous across types. First, instantaneous utilities of
agents ee and uu are not aﬀected. It is neutral for uu since they only earn a constant income δ.
For ee agents, the increase in taxation (which ﬁnances a larger bond supply) is fully oﬀset by the
higher value of the portfolio they sell. On the opposite, types ue do not have any asset to sell (they
were unemployed and thus credit constrained at the preceding period) and only sustain the tax
increase, which make them work more. Finally, agents eu are unemployed, but do not pay any tax:
They therefore beneﬁt from a higher value of their bond portfolio. Instantaneously, a larger bond
supply is a redistribution from ue (who work but do not have any security for sale) to eu (who
are unemployed, but liquidate a bond portfolio). Since the marginal gain of eu is larger than the
marginal loss of ue, and since both types are equally probable, the ﬁrst part of the proposition is
straightforward: ex ante, a larger bond supply is always Pareto improving.
The expected welfare comparison from date 0 point of view, when agents know their type, is
less direct. The expected utility for each type balances today’s impact and tomorrow’s one. It is
noteworthy that the situation of the agent ee (resp. uu) is analogous to the one of eu (resp. ue),
since he is currently not impacted with bond supply. On the one hand, the ue agent’s utility is
positively impacted by a larger bond supply, only if his current loss is oﬀset by the gain of becoming
possibly tomorrow eu: If the agent is patient enough, the increase in bond supply will be welfare
improving. On the other hand, the today’s gain of the agent eu is mitigated by the probability of
becoming tomorrow ue and therefore by the fact from possibly suﬀering from a larger bond supply.
However, instantaneous utilities imply that this possible loss cannot be large enough to oﬀset the
today’s certain gain. Finally, eu agents, as ee ones, always beneﬁt from an increase in bond supply,
whereas ue and thus uu may suﬀer from it, if they are not patient enough.
7 Concluding remarks
This paper has analyzed the yield curve implications of a simple dynamic general equilibrium model
with incomplete markets, and where agents face both idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks. The
model was constructed under the assumption that assets are fully liquidated following an adverse
idiosyncratic income shock. This allowed us to derive analytical expressions for bond prices at any
maturity, and to study how changes in bond issuances could alter the level and slope of the entire
yield curve as well as the welfare of (heterogeneous) agents.
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Other analytical properties of the yield curve can be derived within this framework, and are
available in an extended version of this paper. First, market incompleteness contributes to the
rejection of the expectation hypothesis. Second, when markets are incomplete, bond supply aﬀects
the variance of the yield curve. These results, which stem from the interaction between aggregate
and idiosyncratic risks, ﬁnd some empirical support8. Finally, this simple model could be extended
to study the economic determinants of the yield curve under incomplete markets.
8The expectation hypothesis states that the one period holding return is identical whatever the bond maturity. It
is a natural outcome of yield curve models with complete markets. Data on nominal (Campbell and Shiller (1991))
and real (Seppa¨la¨ (2004)) rates reject this hypothesis.
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A Proof of proposition 1
We prove that Csk are C1 functions of Bi and zh, zl for s = h, l and k, i = 1, . . . , n. We deﬁne the
following matrices (u′l and u′h are deﬁned in (22)):
C =
[
Chn C
l
n . . . C
h
1 C
l
1 C
h
0 C
l
0
]
X = [zh zl B] with B = [Bn . . . B1]
M(C,X) = β
[
πh
(
α + (1− α) zh u′h) (1− πh) (α + (1− α) zl u′l)
(1− πl) (α + (1− α) zh u′h) πl (α + (1− α) zl u′l)
]
(27)
The price structure (23) expresses using preceding notations as (0m×n is the m×n null matrix;
if m = 0 or n = 0, then the matrix has no dimension):
f(C,X) ≡ C −
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
02×2 M(C,X) 02×2 . . . 02×2
...
. . . . . .
...
...
. . . M(C,X)
02×2 . . . 02×2
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ C −
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
0
...
0
1/zh
1/zl
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
= 0(2n+2)×1
Since u′ is C1 on R, M and f are also C1 in (C,X). Before using the implicit function the-
orem to show that C is C1 in (B,X), we prove that the Jacobian DfY = ( ∂f∂Chn ,
∂f
∂Cln
, . . . , ∂f
∂Chn−i
,
∂f
∂Cln−i
, . . . , ∂f
∂Ch0
, ∂f
∂Cl0
) of f relative to C is invertible.
As in (22) for u′h and u′l, we deﬁne u′′h and u′′l as follows:
u′′h ≡ u′′
(
δ +
n−1∑
i=0
Chi z
hBi+1/ω
e
)
and u′′l ≡ u′′
(
δ +
n−1∑
i=0
C li z
lBi+1/ω
e
)
(28)
We express partial derivatives of f relative to Csn−i (i = 0, . . . , n − 1). First, derivatives with
respect to Chn and C
l
n are:
∂f
∂Chn
=
⎡⎢⎢⎣
1
0
02n×1
⎤⎥⎥⎦ , ∂f∂C ln =
⎡⎢⎢⎣
0
1
02n×1
⎤⎥⎥⎦
Second, derivatives relative to Chn−i and C
l
n−i for 1 ≤ i ≤ n are:
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∂f
∂Chn−i
=
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
02(i−1)×1
−β (α + (1− α)zhu′h)πh
−β (α + (1− α)zhu′h) (1− πl)
1
0
02(n−i)×1
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
−β (1− α) (zh)2 u′′h Bn−i+1/ωe
←− Rank 2i + 1
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
πhChn−1
(1− πl)Chn−1
...
πhCh0
(1− πl)Ch0
02×1
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
∂f
∂C ln−i
=
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
02(i−1)×1
−β (α + (1− α)zlu′l) (1− πh)
−β (α + (1− α)zlu′l)πl
0
1
02(n−i)×1
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
−β (1− α) (zl)2 u′′l Bn−i+1/ωe
←− Rank 2i + 2
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
πhC ln−1
(1− πl)C ln−1
...
πhC l0
(1− πl)C l0
02×1
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
The Jacobian DfY expresses as the sum of an upper triangular matrix with only 1 on its
diagonal and a matrix which is equal to 0 when B = 0. Close to the zero net supply, the Jacobian
is invertible and C is a C1 function of B and of {zh, zl}. QED.
B Proof of lemma 1
B.1 Ranking of yield curves.
We prove by inference in the zero net supply case (B = 0) that Chk z
h > C lkz
l for k = 1, . . . , n if
πh + πl > 1 using price deﬁnitions (23).
1. The result holds for k = 1. Indeed, substituting Ch1 and C
l
1 using (23), one ﬁnds that
Ch1 z
h > C l1z
l is equivalent to
α
(
πh − (1− πl) z
l
zh
+
zh
zl
(1− πh)− πl
)
(29)
> (1− α)u′(δ)
(
πlzl + (1− πl)zl − πh zh − (1− πh)zh
)
Since zh ≥ zl and πh + πl − 1 > 0, one can check that the left hand side is strictly positive
whereas the right hand side is strictly negative.
2. For a given maturity k ≥ 2, let us suppose that the result holds for the previous maturity:
20
Chk−1z
h > C lk−1z
l. Proving our result Chk z
h > C lkz
l is equivalent to:
α
((
πh − (1− πl) z
l
zh
)
zh Chk−1
zl C lk−1
+
zh
zl
(1− πh)− πl
)
(30)
≥ (1− α)u′(δ)
(
πlzl + ((1− πl)zl − πh zh)z
h Chk−1
zl C lk−1
− (1− πh)zh
)
First, consider the right hand side RHS. Since zh ≥ zl and πh + πl − 1 > 0, we have (1 −
πl)zl − πh zh < 0. By assumption z
h Chk−1
zl Clk−1
≥ 1, the RHS thus veriﬁes:
RHS < (1− α)u′(δ)
(
πlzl + (1− πl)zl − πhzh − (1− πh)zh
)
< (1− α)u′(δ)(zl − zh) < 0
Second, consider the LHS. Using the same argument as for the RHS, we obtain:
LHS > α
(
πh − πl − (1− πl) z
l
zh
+
zh
zl
(1− πh)
)
> α
(
zh − zl
)(1− πh
zl
+
1− πl
zh
)
> 0
By inference, we obtain Chk z
h > C lkz
l for k = 1, . . . , n if πh + πl > 1. The result is true in
zero supply and still holds, by continuity, for small bond volumes. QED.
B.2 Value of the long run interest rate.
We determine the common value, towards which yields converge in both states. We diagonalize the
matrix M(C,X) deﬁned in (27) as M(C,X) = β QDQ−1. Matrices Q and D are deﬁned as:
Q ≡
⎡⎣ −α(πh−πl)−(α−1)(zhu′hπh−zlu′lπl)−H2(1−πl)(zhu′h(α−1)−α) −α(πh−πl)−(α−1)(zhu′hπh−zlu′lπl)+H2(1−πl)(zhu′h(α−1)−α)
1 1
⎤⎦
D ≡ 1
2
[
α
(
πh + πl
)
+(1− α) (zhu′hπh + zlu′lπl) −H 0
0 α
(
πh + πl
)
+(1− α) (zhu′hπh + zlu′lπl)+ H
]
H ≡
[
(α(πh + πl) + (1− α)(zhπh u′h + zlπl u′l))2 − 4(zh u′h(1− α) + α)(zlu′l(1− α) + α)(πh + πl − 1)
]1/2
(One can check that the term under the square is always positive in the neighborhood of the
zero net supply). We can now diagonalize the matrix deﬁning Ch and C l and modify the system
(23) and iterate it to obtain:[
Chk
C lk
]
= βkQ.Dk.Q−1
[
Ch0
C l0
]
=⇒
[
P hk
P lk
]
= βk
[
zh 0
0 zl
]
Q.Dk.Q−1
[
Ch0
C l0
]
Developing the preceding equality allows us to obtain an analytical expression for P hk . Remark-
ing that H > 0, we simplify the expression with
(
α(πh+πl)−(α−1)(zhu′hπh+zlu′lπl)−H
α(πh+πl)−(α−1)(zhu′hπh+zlu′lπl)+H
)k −→
k→∞
0. As a
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consequence, the price P hk veriﬁes:
lim
k→∞
log
[
Phk
(
1
H
2−k−1βk
)−1 (
α(πh + πl)− (α− 1)(zhu′hπh + zlu′lπl) + H)−k]
= log
[
H − (α(πl − πh) + (α− 1)(zhu′hπh − zlu′lπl))+ 2(α + zlu′l(1− α))(1− πh)zhu′h
zlu′l
]
As rhk = − 1k logP hk , one ﬁnally deduces the expression of rhk when its maturity goes to inﬁnity.
By a simple symmetry argument, one obtains the same expression for the common limit:
lim
k→∞
rhk = lim
k→∞
rlk = r˜
lim = − log β − log α(π
h + πl) + (1− α)(zhu′hπh + zlu′lπl) + H
2
(31)
C Proof of proposition 2
C.1 Impact of bond volumes on prices.
We prove by inference that bond volumes decrease prices and increase yields. We prove the result
for Chk and the method is the same for C
l
k. We begin with expressing the derivative of C
h
k relative
to Bi for 1 ≤ k, i ≤ n (u′′l and u′′h are deﬁned in (28)):
∂Chk
∂Bi
= αβ
(
πh
∂Chk−1
∂Bi
+
(
1− πh
) ∂C lk−1
∂Bi
)
+ (1− α)β
(
πh
∂Chk−1
∂Bi
zh u′h +
(
1− πh
) ∂C lk−1
∂Bi
zl u′l
)
+ (1− α)β πh Chk−1 (zh)2
⎛⎝ n∑
j=1
∂Chj−1
∂Bi
Bj + Chi−1
⎞⎠ u′′h
+ (1− α)β (1− πh)C lk−1(zl)2
⎛⎝ n∑
j=1
∂C lj−1
∂Bi
Bj + C li−1
⎞⎠ u′′l (32)
1. The result holds for k = 1, since the derivative (32) provides for small bond supply:
∂Ch1
∂Bi
≈ (1− α)β
[
πh Chk−1 (z
h)2 Chi−1 u
′′h + (1− πh)C lk−1(zl)2 C li−1 u′′l
]
2. We suppose that the result holds for k − 1 and ∂C
h
k−1
∂Bi
,
∂Clk−1
∂Bi
< 0. Since Csj is a C1 function
of Bi,
∂Csj−1
∂Bi
is continuous in Bi and Bj
∂Csj−1
∂Bi
(s = h, l) is negligible relative to Csi−1 for small
bond supply. Eq. (32) implies that ∂C
h
k
∂Bi
< 0. Larger bond supply decreases prices. QED.
C.2 Impact of bond volumes on the slope.
We prove that larger bond volumes steepen the curve. Using the expression (31) of r˜lim and the
one of r1 ((24) and the price structure (23)), the derivative of the slope relative to Bj for j ≤ n
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expresses as:
∂
∂Bj
∆ = (1− α)(1− π
h)(1− πl)(zh − zl)
2− πh − πl ×
(
zl
πlzh + (1− πl)zl
∂u′l
∂Bj
− z
h
(1− πh)zh + πhzl
∂u′h
∂Bj
)
+O
(
(1− α)2)
with (we also give expressions when the bond supply is close to 0):
∂
∂Bj
u′h = zh
(
n∑
k=1
∂Chk
∂Bj
Bk+1 + Chj−1
)
u′′
(
δ + B1 + zh
n∑
k=1
Chk Bk+1
)
≈ zh Chj−1 u′′(δ)
∂
∂Bj
u′l = zl
(
n∑
k=1
∂C lk
∂Bj
Bk+1 + C lj−1
)
u′′
(
δ + B1 + zl
n∑
k=1
C lk Bk+1
)
≈ zl C lj−1 u′′(δ)
The sign of ∂∂Bj ∆ depends on the sign of A ≡ z
l
πlzh+(1−πl)zl
∂u′l
∂Bj
− zh
(1−πh)zh+πhzl
∂u′h
∂Bj
. Substituting
the derivatives by their values allows to express A when bond supply is close to 0 as:
A˜ =
(
zl
πl(zh − zl) + zlC
l
j−1z
l − z
h
πh (zl − zh) + zhC
h
j−1z
h
)
u′′ (δ)
As zh > zl, a suﬃcient condition for A˜ to be positive is Chj−1z
h > C lj−1z
l, which is always true.
Thus, bond volumes increase the slope of the curve as soon as πh + πl > 1. QED.
D Proof of proposition 3
We prove that: (i) ex ante welfare increases with bond supply and (ii) at date 0, the welfare of eu
and uu goes only if the discount factor β is large enough. We suppose that there is no aggregate
shock and zt = 1. We note U the vector of instantaneous utility. Using budget constraints, it
expresses as:
U =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
u(cee)− lee
u(cue)− lue
u(ceu)− leu
u(cuu)− luu
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
u
(
u′−1(1)
)− 1
u
(
u′−1(1)
)− 1−∑nk=1 Ck−1 Bk
u (δ +
∑n
k=1 Ck−1 Bk)
u(δ)
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
The transition matrix Ω for the four states {ee ue eu uu} of the economy is the following:
Ω =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
α 0 1− α 0
α 0 1− α 0
0 1− ρ 0 ρ
0 1− ρ 0 ρ
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ = Q.D.Q−1, with Q =
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
1 1− α 0 1− α
1 0 ρ 1− α
1 −α 0 −(1− ρ)
1 0 −(1− ρ) −(1− ρ)
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
and D = Diag(1 0 0 α + ρ− 1).
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The vector U of the four intertemporal utilities is U =∑∞k=0 βk Ωk U =∑∞k=0 βk QDk Q−1 U
The impact of a bond increase Bk on this intertemporal utility U is:
∂U
∂Bk
=
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
∂Uee
∂Bk
∂Uue
∂Bk
∂Ueu
∂Bk
∂Uuu
∂Bk
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ = Ck−1 Q.
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
1
1−β 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 11−β(α+ρ−1)
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ .Q−1
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
0
−1
u′ (δ +
∑n
k=1 Ck−1 Bk)
0
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
First, the ﬁrst part of the proposition stems directly from the impact of bond supply on in-
stantaneous utility. Whereas in the states ee and uu, the utility does not change, it decreases from
−1 in ue and goes up from u′ = u′ (δ +∑nk=1 Ck−1 Bk) in eu. Since our equilibrium exists only if
u′ = u′ (δ +
∑n
k=1 Ck−1 Bk) > 1, and that eu and ue states are equally probable, ex ante welfare
always increases with bond supply.
To obtain the second part of the result, we expand the preceding expression of ∂U∂Bk :
∂U
∂Bk
=
Ck−1
(2− α− ρ)(1− β)(1− β(α + ρ− 1)
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
β(1− α)(u′ − β(1 + ρ(u′ − 1)))
(1− βρ)(β(α + (1− α)u′)− 1)
(1− βα)(u′ − β(1 + ρ(u′ − 1)))
β(1− ρ)(β(α + (1− α)u′)− 1)
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
Noting β0 = [α + (1− α)u′ (δ +
∑n
k=1 Ck−1 Bk)]
−1, it is straightforward to prove that if β > β0,
the expected welfare of all agents’ types increases with Bk and if β < β0, that the welfare of ue
and uu decreases.
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